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Abstract
Theories of decoherence come in two flavors—Platonic and Aristotelian. Platonists
grant ontological primacy to the concepts and mathematical symbols by which we
describe or comprehend the physical world. Aristotelians grant it to the physical
world. The significance one attaches to the phenomenon of decoherence depends on
the school to which one belongs. The debate about the significance of quantum states
has for the most part been carried on between Platonists and Kantians, who advocate
an epistemic interpretation, with Aristotelians caught in the crossfire. For the latter,
quantum states are neither states of Nature nor states of knowledge. The real issue
is not the kind of reality that we should attribute to quantum states but the reality
of the spatial and temporal distinctions that we make. Once this is recognized, the
necessity of attributing ontological primacy to facts become obvious, the Platonic
stance becomes inconsistent, and the Kantian point of view becomes unnecessarily
restrictive and unilluminating.
1 INTRODUCTION
Theories of decoherence come in two flavors—Platonic and Aristotelian. A Platonist is one who
grants ontological primacy to concepts and mathematical symbols, especially those by which we
describe or comprehend the physical world. An Aristotelian is one who grants ontological pri-
macy to the physical world that we describe or comprehend through concepts and mathematical
symbols. (This is all the reader needs to know about Platonists and Aristotelians.) True to its
label, the Platonic theory of decoherence attaches ontological primacy to the (unitarily evolving)
quantum state of the universe. Its aim is to explain why, on macroscopic scales, the world looks
classical to observing systems. The Aristotelian theory, on the other hand, attaches ontological
primacy to facts. It views quantum mechanics as a theory exclusively concerned with the statis-
tical correlations between property-indicating facts or, equivalently, between properties indicated
by facts. Its aim is to explain why the positions of macroscopic objects are so correlated that
they not only supervene on the property-indicating facts but also constitute them.
Decoherence [1, 2] is not a part of any interpretational strategy. It is a physical phe-
nomenon [3, 4] predicted by quantum mechanics and, like quantum mechanics itself, in need
of an interpretation. That is why there are two theories of decoherence, at the least. This article
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is concerned with the conceptual differences between these theories, rather than with quanti-
tative issues, on which both theories agree. The two theories are discussed in Secs. 2 and 3,
respectively.
Section 4 introduces a third species of physicist, the Kantians, who favor an epistemic inter-
pretation of quantum states. Since the early days of quantum physics it was the Platonists and
the Kantians who carried on between them the debate about the meaning of quantum states,
the former looking upon them as states of Nature, the latter proclaiming them to be states of
knowledge. Both positions are equally unpalatable to the Aristotelians—mostly experimentalists
who worry about the state of their apparatus rather than the state of their knowledge, and who
need quantum states for only one purpose, namely to calculate the probabilities of measurement
outcomes. For an Aristotelian, quantum states are encapsulations of statistical correlations be-
tween property-indicating facts—correlations that are as objective as any of the deterministic
regularities encapsulated by the dynamical laws of classical physics. While this is all there is
to a quantum state, it is by no means all there is to quantum mechanics, for these correlations
contain a message of considerable ontological significance, a message concerning the spatial and
temporal differentiation of the physical world [5].
The label “Aristotelian” for the interpretation preferred by this author is appropriate for
another reason: It was Aristotle who first thought of the divisions that we mentally project
into the physical continua as existing potentially, rather than actually, unless their actuality is
warranted by something not found in the continua themselves. This something is a position-
indicating fact. Quantum mechanics—the theory of the correlations between property-indicating
facts—tells us under what conditions and to what extent our conceptual partitions of space and
time have counterparts in the physical world.
2 DECOHERENCE: THE PLATONIC VERSION
The theory of decoherence discussed in this section is, true to its Platonic underpinnings, an
idealization—an archetypal Form (eidos) not perhaps found in its noumenal purity in the writings
of any actually existing einselectionist (einselection = environment induced superselection [6]).
No concrete models are considered, no calculations of decoherence scales or recurrence times are
carried out. There is no reference to POVMs (positive operator valued measures [7]), despite
their obvious appropriateness to actual measurement situations, in which the orthogonality of
the indicating properties rarely implies the orthogonality of the indicated properties. (For quan-
titative studies of decoherence see Ref. [8] and work cited therein. For an account of decoherence
based on POVMs see Ref. [9].) As far as the issues considered in this article are concerned, these
quantitative or formal niceties do not matter.
A Platonist attaches ontological primacy to concepts and mathematical symbols. The obvious
candidate for representing what a Platonist regards as ultimately real is the state vector |Ψ(t)〉
of the Universe. Since there isn’t any apparatus external to the Universe, this evolves strictly
according to ih¯|Ψ˙〉 = Hˆ|Ψ〉 with some Hermitean operator Hˆ.
For Platonists the existence of concrete individuals has always been an embarrassment. It
2
ought to be derived from what is ultimately real, yet it cannot be derived from general terms
inasmuch as general terms do not imply the existence of singular terms. To get horses out of
horseness Plato needed to invoke
that which is duly to receive over its whole extent and many times over all the
likenesses of the intelligible and eternal things, . . . the mother and Receptacle of what
has come to be visible and otherwise sensible, . . . a nature invisible and characterless,
all-receiving, partaking in some very puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard
to apprehend. [10]
Modern Platonists sidestep the problem of the existence of individuals by pointing out that the
classical demeanor of the macroworld can be understood only in terms of correlations between
individual systems [8]. The Platonic account of decoherence begins with the assumption that
the Universe is a collection of interacting systems. Certain systems possess a (limited) ability
to gather and retain information. The acquisition of information about a system S by an
information gathering system A (the “apparatus”) takes place in an “environment” E. If S is
sufficiently large or massive, it cannot be isolated from E. The interaction Hamiltonian HˆSE
then depends on the position of S relative to E but not on the momentum of S relative to E.
As a consequence, E acquires information about the (successive) positions of S, and only about
these, and this information is redundantly recorded in E.
Suppose that A is about to measure the position of S, that the states |Si〉 are the localized
states of S which A can distinguish, and that the spatial resolution of the measurement does
not exceed the resolution with which E monitors the position of S. Then the measurement
interaction causes S+A+E to evolve according to
N∑
i=1
ci|Si〉|A0〉|Ei〉 −→ |ψSAE〉 =
N∑
i=1
ci|Si〉|Ai〉|Ei〉,
where |A0〉 represents the neutral state of the pointer, and the kets |Ai〉 represent the pointer as
indicating a possible measurement result. If the resolution with which E monitors the position
of S sufficiently exceeds the resolution of the apparatus, the kets |Ei〉 will be as good as mutually
orthogonal, so the state of S+A will be almost exactly equal to the reduced density matrix
ρSA =
N∑
i=1
|ci|
2|Si〉〈Si| |Ai〉〈Ai|
obtained by a partial trace on the environment indices. The measurement is therefore repeatable.
Performed again after a time ∆t still short enough for the system’s self-evolution (due to the
Hamiltonian HˆS alone) to be negligible, it will yield the same result. The result is predictable
because the information acquired by A merely confirms information already in possession of E,
and because within the time span ∆t this information changes negligibly.
Now suppose instead that A measures a nonlocal observable—an observable Q whose eigen-
states are superpositions of localized states of S superselected by E. In this case the measure-
ment is no longer repeatable once the decoherence time ∆td has passed. For a macroscopic
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object ∆td ≪ ∆t. The environment’s incessant monitoring of S almost immediately destroys
the coherence of the eigenstates of Q, so that the information acquired by A cannot be used for
making predictions.
Classical objects follow trajectories in phase space (time-ordered sequences of positions and
momenta) that are predictable, at least in the absence of chaos. Macroscopic objects behave
much like classical ones, and einselection is the reason why. E keeps monitoring the position
of S with a limited spatial resolution. Owing to this limited resolution the position of S remains
somewhat uncertain, and the momentum of S retains some of its sharpness. As a consequence,
the trajectory of a macroscopic object S in phase space is predictable, to within the spatial
resolution achieved by E, for some time T . In the absence of chaos T is astronomical, while
for a chaotic system it can be quite short. (Without decoherence the orientation of Hyperion,
Saturn’s chaotically tumbling moon, would have to be described by a coherent superposition of
orientations that differ by 2pi after approximately 20 years. [11, 12])
Plato acknowledged two kinds of reality, which we may call being and existence. Being—the
most general term—is what is real per se. It is inherited by all general terms. Existence is what
those things have to which singular terms refer. General terms are but do not exist . Individual
things exist because they are (delimited) portions of the Receptacle, and because they partake of
the being of some general term. Since individual things owe their existence partly to something—
the Receptacle—that by itself neither is nor exists, their reality is at bottom illusory. As Plato
put it, while one may have opinions about them, one cannot have any knowledge of them.
For the Platonic einselectionist, it is the deterministically evolving universal state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 that is real per se. States of a component system are not real per se but they may
exist [13]. The key criterion is predictability [14]: A state of S exists if and only if an apparatus
A can come to “know” it without “disturbing” it. The only states that satisfy this criterion are
the einselected states. Hence only they exist. The universal state |Ψ(t)〉 is but does not exist ,
for want of both an environment that could make it predictable and an apparatus that could
come to “know” it. Einselected states seem to be intrinsically possessed and merely revealed
by observation, but at bottom this too is an illusion. There are no intrinsically possessed
states. There are only correlations between states. Einselected states exist, not because they are
intrinsically possessed, but because they are predictably correlated. Their existence supervenes
on the correlations between them. Considered in themselves, apart from their correlations, they
exist as little as Plato’s Receptacle does according to Plato.
The diagonal density matrix ρSA contains conditional information: If (and only if) S is in
the state |Si〉〈Si| then (and only then) A is in the state |Ai〉〈Ai|. This is true for every i. What
determines the truth values of the antecedents? Not E, for the environment only makes sure
that each of those states is predictable; it does not single out a particular i. The einselectionist’s
definition of existence implies that all of those states exist in an index-specific sense: It is true
for all i that both |Si〉〈Si| and |Ai〉〈Ai| “i-exist,” and that neither of them “j-exists” unless j = i.
Thus if A acquires information about the state of S, it comes to exist in N different senses or,
equivalently, in N different worlds or, equivalently, in N different minds [15].
Existence is relative not only in that it comes in different, index-specific kinds but also in
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that there can be more or less of it. The existence of a state can be quantified by the redundancy
with which it is recorded elsewhere in the Universe, or by the number of times it can be found
out independently. Relative existence becomes absolute and unsubvertible only in the limit in
which the redundancy goes to infinity and cloning of unknown states becomes possible [8].
3 DECOHERENCE: THE ARISTOTELIAN VERSION
The first thing a modern Aristotelian would stress is the extra-theoretical nature of reality.
The laws of classical physics do not uniquely determine the actual world; they determine a
set of nomologically possible worlds, of which the actual world is one. Classical physics has
no criterion for picking out the actual world—the one that is not only possible but also real .
Nor has quantum physics. Like the actual course of events in classical physics, the universal
state vector |Ψ(t)〉 depends on initial conditions, and for all we know these are not uniquely
determined by physical law. In addition to this, each nomologically possible evolution of |Ψ(t)〉
is associated with a considerable number of classical domains in which macroscopic objects follow
quasi-definite trajectories in phase space, as the previous section has shown. Since these classical
domains exist in different senses, it would be incorrect to say that they coexist , for things that
coexist share the same kind of existence. The sense in which these classical domains “exist” and
“coexist” is none other than the sense in which possible worlds exist and coexist. (Reminder:
Saying that a possibility X exists is the same as saying that X is possible.)
The central role played by probabilities in most interpretations of the formalism of quantum
mechanics suggests that the first question that ought to be addressed is, probabilities of what?
Of possibilities, no doubt, but not every possibility can be assigned a Born probability. There is
the possibility that an attempted measurement succeeds—that it yields a result. And then there
is the possibility that a successful measurement yields this particular result rather than another.
Born probabilities are associated exclusively with possibilities of the latter kind. The trace rule
presupposes facts not only because it assigns probabilities on the basis of property-indicating
facts (the “preparation”) but also because it assigns probabilities to properties on condition that
one of them is indicated [16, 17, 18].
For this reason Aristotelians attach ontological primacy to facts—actual events or states of
affairs involving properties of actually existing material objects. What is ultimately real, accord-
ing to them, is such actual events as the click of a counter and such actual states of affairs as the
orientation of a pointer needle. These facts do not simply reveal properties that are intrinsically
possessed. On this point Platonists and Aristotelians agree: There are no intrinsically possessed
properties. Their disagreement concerns the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
(i) of possessed properties and (ii) of probabilities.
The Platonic view is that states and the properties they connote exist if and only if they are
predictably correlated. The existence of the correlata supervenes on the correlations, subject to
einselection. Einselection makes sure that the existing correlata constitute separate classical do-
mains following quasi-definite trajectories in phase space. For Aristotelians properties exist if and
only if their possession is indicated. The existence of the correlata supervenes on the facts that
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constitute the classical domain. In other words, the values of quantum-mechanical observables
are extrinsic: No property is a possessed property unless it is an indicated property [16, 17, 18].
As regards probabilities, the Platonic view is (i) that they exist if and only if they are
associated with possible states, and (ii) that states are possible if and only if they are pre-
dictably correlated [8]. The Platonic conditions under which states are possible are thus the
same as those under which states exists, which again shows that Platonic existence is nothing
but nomological possibility. To the Aristotelian way of thinking property-indicating facts de-
termine unitarily “evolving” density matrices whose sole purpose it is to assign probabilities
to the possible outcomes of possible measurements at specified times. Born probabilities exist
only for such (actually or counterfactually obtained) outcomes. (A “measurement outcome” is a
property-indicating fact. It is irrelevant whether this came about with the help of experimenters,
or whether there is anyone around to take cognizance of what is indicated.)
The word “specified” is essential. The parameter t on which (in the Schro¨dinger picture)
a density matrix ρ (t) depends does not refer to a continuous succession of self-existent and
intrinsically distinct moments. It refers to the specified time of measurement of a specified
observable or set of observables. ρ (t) is not something that exists or obtains throughout some
time span and alternates between unitary evolution and collapse. It is an algorithm for assigning
probabilities to the possible outcomes of possible measurements. The quantum formalism does
not “know” which observables are measured and when they are measured. Before it can tell
us the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes of a measurement, we must tell it
not only which observables are measured but also the time at which they are (successfully)
measured [16, 17, 18].
Accordingly, the trace formula
p (GS , GA, GE , t) = Tr (|ψSAE(t)〉〈ψSAE(t)|PSPAPE)
gives the joint probability that S, A, and E possess the respective properties GS , GA, and
GE at the time t provided that there are facts that indicate whether or not these properties
are possessed at the time t. (PS , PA, and PE are the corresponding projection operators in
the respective Hilbert spaces of S, A, and E.) Yet if E includes everything but S+A, there is
nothing external to S+A+E by which properties of S, A, and E could be indicated. Aristotelians
therefore need to show that a part of the environment admits of two conceptual representations,
a density-matrix representation that serves to assign probabilities to its possible properties, and
a “classical” representation according to which certain properties are intrinsically possessed and
therefore capable of indicating something.
Platonists accept unquestioningly that the parameter t on which a density matrix depends
refers to a continuous succession of intrinsically distinct moments. From this (from the Aris-
totelian point of view erroneous) assumption there arises the need of a criterion for distinguishing
states that exist at a time t (along with the properties or the values they connote) from states
that do not exist at the time t. Since in reality t refers to the time of a measurement, this
need is spurious. A quantum state is not something that exists at a time t, anymore than the
probability of finding a particle in a region R is something that exists inside R. Accordingly,
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we do not need decoherence to tell us when quantum states exist. We need it to establish the
consistency of the aforesaid two representations of the environment.
Given the extra-theoretical nature of reality, a choice has to be made. Platonists place the
burden of reality on |Ψ(t)〉, the Hamiltonian Hˆ, and certain other theoretical accouterments, and
attribute the “emergence of classicality” to the interactions between observing systems, observed
systems, and their environment. Aristotelians regard it as inconsistent (i) to hitch reality to a
formalism whose sole purpose it is to encapsulate correlations between property-indicating facts,
and (ii) to believe that the reality of facts is an inferior kind of reality, confined to what observing
systems can learn. They place the burden of reality squarely on the facts, including those on
which the values of quantum-mechanical observables supervene—without denying that at bottom
all properties are extrinsic: Even the Moon is there only because of the (myriads of) facts that
betoken its whereabouts [19]. Position-indicating facts constitute its being there. This obligates
the Aristotelians to demonstrate the existence of a special class of macroscopic objects whose
positions are at the same time—for all quantitative purposes rather than merely all practical
ones—intrinsic.
What the Platonic theory of decoherence has established is that all nomologically possible
worlds look (almost) classical on macroscopic scales: Sufficiently large and/or massive objects
follow quasi-definite trajectories in phase space. This result depends on the correlations between
S, A, and E regardless of the ontological status of the correlata. For Aristotelians the correlata
are properties indicated by facts. Some of these, including the positions of sufficiently large
and/or massive objects, are predictably correlated. Every time the position of such an object
is indicated, its value is consistent with a definite trajectory in phase space. We can therefore
conceive of the positions of such objects as forming a self-contained system of positions that
“dangle” causally from each other, rather than ontologically from position-indicating facts. We
can ignore their extrinsic nature and consider them factual per se. We can then attribute the
possession of any property to its being indicated by the position of at least one such object. This
is how an Aristotelian would establish the existence of a special class of macroscopic objects
whose positions are at the same time (at bottom) extrinsic and (for all quantitative purposes)
intrinsic [5, 16, 18]. These positions are the properties of which facts are made—or, to put it
more prosaically, the properties to which observer-independent factuality can be consistently
attributed.
In the Platonic scheme of things the correlations, as aspects of the universal state vector,
have ontological priority over the correlata. What is studied, accordingly, is the information that
one system can obtain about another, via the correlations. The central result of the Platonic
theory of decoherence—that all nomologically possible worlds look (almost) classical on macro-
scopic scales—is therefore limited to information that is accessible to observing systems. In the
Aristotelian scheme of things, the correlata enjoy an observer-independent reality. Properties
that are not predictably correlated exist (independently of observers) because they are indicated
by properties that are so correlated, and because the latter can be treated as factual per se.
According to the Platonic theory the classical domain looks to A like a system of intrinsically
possessed properties. According to the Aristotelian theory the classical domain behaves like a
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system of intrinsically possessed properties, and for this reason we can consider it factual per
se—we can attribute to it that extra-theoretical something which sets off the actual world against
all merely possible ones.
Einselection actually serves the Aristotelians better than it serves the Platonists. According
to the latter, the diagonality of a density matrix is necessary for the existence of states. But
relative to the intrinsically and infinitely differentiated temporal background presupposed by the
Platonists the off-diagonal terms never vanish completely, though they may become very small
very fast and remain so for a very long time. Consequently, states not only exist in different
senses (corresponding to different possible worlds) but also in different degrees. No state exists
absolutely since this would require strictly vanishing off-diagonal terms.
Aristotelians, on the other hand, can point to the finite spatial differentiation of the physical
world [5, 16, 18], which implies that no physical system can, during a finite time span T , be in
an infinite number of states such that each state is distinct from (orthogonal to) its immediate
predecessor. Even the environment does not pass through infinitely many distinct states in a
finite time, so there is nothing that could indicate the position of a macroscopic object M at
an infinite number of distinct times during T . The relevant question therefore is not whether
certain terms that enter into the calculation of probabilities vanish. The relevant question
is, are the indicated positions of M consistent with a classical trajectory? If infinitely many
successive positions were indicated, each having a small prior probability of being inconsistent
with a classical trajectory, some facts would be inconsistent with a classical trajectory unless
those terms vanished strictly. But since no more than a finite number of successive positions
are indicated, those terms only need to be sufficiently small for it to be highly probable that all
indicated positions are strictly consistent with a classical trajectory. This is why Aristotelians
can claim that macroscopic objects exist, and that by definition they follow definite trajectories
in phase space, not just for all practical purposes but for all quantitative ones [5, 16, 18].
Platonists have to live with the danger of “recoherence.” Correlations can in principle disap-
pear; memory states can vanish without a trace; nothing exists for sure. For Aristotelians these
dangers do not exist. A fact is a fact. If something indicates the possession, at a time t, by a
system S or an observable Q, of a property G or a value q, then it always has been and always
will be true that S has the property G, or Q has the value q, at the time t. There is nothing
subvertible or reversible about this.
4 BEYOND DECOHERENCE
A consistent theory of the physical continuum that embraces
Aristotle’s insights does not exist to this day; it would surely
have to be a quantum theory.—C.F. von Weizsa¨cker [20, p. 350]
The label “Aristotelian” is appropriate for another reason. It was Aristotle who inaugurated
the potential conception of the continuum and of the infinite, which avoids the paradoxes en-
gendered by the conception of an actually existing infinite and of an infinitely and intrinsically
differentiated continuum—from those pointed out by Zeno to those arising from the concept of
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the set of all sets [20, p. 346][21, 22].
From the point of view of a present-day Aristotelian, the concept of an intrinsically and
infinitely partitioned space or time is as inconsistent with quantum mechanics as the concept
of absolute simultaneity is with special relativity [5, 16, 17]. It is physical systems that are
partitioned spacewise and timewise, or else it is for physical systems that space and time are
partitioned. Even for a macroscopic object M space is only finitely partitioned, in the sense
that no finite region R can be considered partitioned into infinitely many regions Ri such that
(indicated) truth values exist for all propositions “M is inside Ri.” As a consequence, time too
is only finitely partitioned, in the sense that no object passes through an infinite sequence of
successively distinct (orthogonal) states in a finite time span, as was pointed out in the previous
section.
The finite spatial and temporal differentiation of the physical world is arguably the most
significant ontological implication of quantum mechanics [5, 16, 23, 24]. It is a consequence of
the indefiniteness of all relative positions which, together with the exclusion principle, “fluffs
out” matter, and which entails the extrinsic nature of the values of quantum-mechanical ob-
servables [5, 18]. It implies that the world is not built bottom-up, on an infinitely differentiated
space, out of locally instantiated physical properties. The cardinal error of the Platonic theory is
its unquestioning acceptance of the field-theoretic notion of an intrinsically and infinitely differ-
entiated space and time, without which not deterministic evolution could be postulated for any
function of space and/or time coordinates. Spatial distinctions supervene on the facts, and the
facts never warrant the actual existence of sharply bounded regions or exact positions. There-
fore even the positions of macroscopic objects are fuzzy—but only in relation to an unrealized
degree of spatial differentiation (that is, only in relation to an imaginary backdrop that is more
differentiated spacewise than is the physical world). The regions over which the position of a
macroscopic object is “smeared out” exist solely in our minds. That is why we can treat the
positions of macroscopic objects as intrinsic.
The reason why we must treat them as intrinsic is that otherwise there wouldn’t be any
positions. The positions of things are physically defined by, and relative to, the positions of
macroscopic things—and never more sharply than the latter. Macroscopic detectors are needed
not only to indicate the possession of a position but also to realize (make real) an attributable
position. By the same token, macroscopic clocks, indicating time by the positions of macroscopic
hands, are needed not only to indicate the time of possession of a property but also to realize
that time.
It thus appears that ever since the introduction of quantum states into physics we have been
asking the wrong questions. The debate continues about whether a wave function ψ (x, t), x
being a point in a configuration space, represents a state of Nature, as the Platonists have it, or
a state of knowledge, as the Kantians [5, 25, 26] believe. It represents neither. The real question
is not whether ψ represents an existing state of whatever kind but whether or not t and x refer
to an intrinsically and infinitely differentiated physical manifold. The real issue is not the reality
of quantum states but the reality of the spatial and temporal distinctions we make.
The reality of these distinctions is both contingent and limited. The regions L and R defined
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by the two slits in a double-slit experiment with electrons are real and distinct for an electron e
if and only if the truth values of the propositions “e went through L” and “e went through R”
are indicated by facts—that is, if and only if they have truth values [5]. Only possessed positions
exist, and possessed positions supervene on facts. So do the times at which they are possessed.
So does the spatiotemporal aspect of the physical world, which consists of the positions of
things and the times at which they are possessed. And these positions and times never have
perfectly sharp values, as they would have to if space and time were intrinsically and infinitely
differentiated. (If L and R were distinct per se, no electron could go through a double-slit
without going through a particular slit and without being divided by its passage through the
slits. The intrinsic distinctness of L and R would imply the existence of distinct parts.)
The reality of an intrinsically and infinitely differentiated space and time is taken for granted
by both the Platonists and the Kantians. Combined with the doctrine of determinism and a
naive mathematical realism, this leads the former to confine the reality of facts to the information
that observing systems can obtain. (Apparently this does not deter systems with a Platonic
turn of mind from attributing to statistical regularities distilled from observations a stronger,
independent kind of reality.) Combined with the Kantian doctrine that space and time lie in the
mind of the beholder, it prevents the latter from arriving at a consistent observer-independent
conception of the physical world [5]. Einselectionists and information fundamentalists thus have
much more in common than they realize or are willing to admit. Proceeding from the same
misconception, both arrive at the philosophically defunct dichotomy of a real world “out there”
and a known world “in here.”
Caught in the crossfire between Platonists and Kantians, Aristotelians must fight on two
fronts. Because of their insistence on the observer-independent reality of the physical world,
the Kantians look upon them as Platonists, and because of their insistence that quantum states
are nothing but probability measures, the Platonists look upon them as Kantians. A central
claim of the Aristotelians is that the regions over which the position of a macroscopic object is
“smeared out” exist solely in our minds. From this one might conclude that all of space lies
in the mind of the beholder, and that Aristotelians are therefore crypto-Kantians, but this is a
non sequitur . That some regions of space exist solely in our minds does not imply the same for
all spatial properties.
Again, decoherence being an important step in the Aristotelian argument for the legitimacy
of treating the positions of macroscopic objects as factual per se, one might conclude that all
that is thereby established is the relative and intersubjective reality of the classical domain, and
that Aristotelians are therefore crypto-Platonists. But this too is a non sequitur . It would follow
if the positions/times on which a wave function depends were the intrinsic positions/times of an
intrinsically and infinitely differentiated physical space/time, for then the epistemic nature of
wave-function collapses (in the context of unadulterated, standard quantum mechanics) would
be beyond question. In this case einselection can at best ensure the macroscopic predictability of
observations. In the Aristotelian theory of decoherence, on the other hand, einselection ensures
the macroscopic predictability that is a necessary condition for the attribution of factuality. The
reality established by the Aristotelians, therefore, is the observer-independent reality of facts, of
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properties whose possession is indicated by facts, of the positions of macroscopic objects that
ultimately constitute the facts, and of the statistical correlations that obtain among property-
indicating facts.
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